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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 991078-CA 
v. : 
TROY REES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) 
(1998 & Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Where defendant argues that (a) police did not reasonably rely on the 
consent of his occasional stay-over girlfriend to conduct a warrantless search of his 
trailer home; and that (b) the affidavit in support of the search warrant for a safe 
located inside the trailer was insufficient, can this Court review the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress without seeing the transcripts of the evidence 
adduced at the preliminary and suppression hearings, and/or the affidavit, all of 
which the trial court relied upon? 
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing 
court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
{citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. 
Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Absent 
an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will necessarily assume the regularity 
of the proceedings below. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). See also State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 131 
(Utah App. 1997) ("When a party fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we will 
presume the correctness of the proceedings below."). 
2. Where the evidence established, inter alia, that defendant possessed 
approximately 129 grams of marijuana, or enough to make at least 129 joints, and 
that marijuana stays fresh for only three to four weeks, is the trial court's finding 
that defendant intended to distribute and/or share the marijuana well supported? 
This Court accepts a trial court's factual findings absent clear error. Johnson v. 
Higley, 1999 UT App 278, f 16, 989 P.2d 61, cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000). 
The trial court's application of law to those facts is reviewed for correctness, "albeit with 
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some measure of deference to the trial court's assessment." Id. (citing State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936-937 (Utah 1994)). In order to show clear error, the appellant must marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that 
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 475 (Utah 1990). 
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
3. Can this Court review defendant's claim that the district court erred in 
setting a preliminary hearing after the case was once dismissed, without seeing the 
record from the prior dismissed proceeding? 
The same standard of review as set forth for issue number one, supra, applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH R. APP. P. 11(e)(2): 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such a finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct 
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9): 
An Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts fo the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (1998 & Supp. 
2000) (R. 1). 
On 3 June 1999, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a 
warrantless search of his trailer home (R. 26). An evidentiary hearing on the motion was 
held on 15 June 1999 (R. 35-37). However, defendant did not file a supporting 
memorandum until 7 October 1999, two days after the bench trial which was held on 5 
October 1999 (R. 55-57) (see R. 103:201-205). The State's responsive memorandum was 
filed on 15 October 1999 (R. 66-82). The trial court therefore reserved ruling on the 
motion to suppress and felony drug charge until 21 October 1999, at which time the trial 
court denied defendant's motion in an oral ruling (R. 104:2-5) (a copy of the oral ruling is 
contained in the addendum). The trial court also found defendant guilty as charged (R. 
104:5-7), and imposed a 0-5 year prison term, which was suspended in lieu of a 3 year 
probationary term (R. 86). Defendant timely appealed (R. 95). 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At approximately 8:30 a.m., on 7 August 1998, Deputy Bamett of the Weber 
County Sheriffs Office, and the Mayor of Fair West, Utah, went to property located at 
1825 North 200 West in Farr West to discuss re-zoning the area with property owner 
David Hunt (R. 103:20-24). After unsuccessful attempts to find Hunt in a warehouse on 
the property, Deputy Bamett knocked on the door of a fifth wheel trailer which was 
parked nearby (R. 103:23). A female voice said, "Come on in" (id.). After Deputy 
Bamett opened the door, the female inside repeated, "Come on in" (R. 103:24). Upon 
entering the trailer, Deputy Bamett immediately detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana 
(R. 103:26). The female, who appeared to be the sole occupant of the trailer, was 
wearing pajamas and was wrapped in a blanket (R. 103:25-26). The deputy observed 
that there were several food items and articles of clothing scattered around, and also that 
there was a bed and bedding in the nose of the trailer (id). 
After introducing himself, and without mentioning the burnt marijuana smell, 
Deputy Bamett asked if Hunt was around (R. 103:27). The woman identified herself as 
Doreen Atkin and said that Hunt was only at the property "off and on," and that if his 
truck was gone, he was not around (id). She then looked outside and confirmed that 
Hunt's truck was not there (id). 
lrThe facts are stated in the light most favorable to the bench verdict. See Johnson 
v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, f2, 989 P.2d 61, 61 (bench trial). 
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Concluding that Hunt was not on the property, Deputy Barnett asked Atkin about 
the burnt marijuana smell inside the trailer (id.). Atkin told him that two other individuals 
had come into the trailer earlier to look for her boyfriend, defendant, and that they had 
been smoking a marijuana cigarette (R. 103:32). Atkin also said that the trailer belonged 
to defendant and that she stayed there overnight because her air conditioner was broken 
(R. 103:28). 
Deputy Barnett asked Atkin for permission to search the trailer and Atkin 
consented saying, "Sure, go ahead. Take a look around" (R. 103:27-28). Deputy Barnett 
walked into the kitchen area, and looking into a garbage bag hanging from a cabinet, saw 
four marijuana stems (R. 103:29). Deputy Barnett asked Atkin if she had been smoking, 
which she denied and also stated that the marijuana stems belonged to the individuals that 
had been smoking marijuana in the trailer earlier (R. 103:32). Deputy Barnett asked if he 
could continue to search and Atkin replied: "Hey, yeah, please look around" (R. 103:32). 
Atkin also identified some bags as hers and invited the deputy to look inside them as well 
(id.). No contraband was located inside the bags (R. 103:33). 
Deputy Barnett next looked inside a kitchen cabinet and found a small cookie tin 
containing loose marijuana, two marijuana pipes (including one that was filled with 
marijuana), two packages of rolling papers, several used plastic baggies, and two baggies 
still containing marijuana (R. 103:33-38). There was also a key ring with approximately 
four keys and a bank card bearing the name 'Troy's Trucking" (R. 103:35-36). The total 
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weight of the marijuana found in cupboard was 42.1 grams (R. 103:38). 
At that point, Deputy Barnett told Atkin that he needed to find out who the 
marijuana belonged to and asked that she contact defendant (R. 103:40). Atkin called 
defendant on a cellular phone and Deputy Barnett told him that he needed to speak with 
him about the marijuana in his trailer (R. 103:41). Approximately 45 minutes later, 
defendant arrived at the trailer and was promptly given his Miranda rights, which he 
waived (R. 103:41-42).2 
Following defendant's statement to Deputy Barnett, he was arrested and the trailer 
was seized and inventoried (R. 103:46-48).3 During the inventory search, a locked safe 
was discovered inside one of the trailer's cabinets (R. 103:48). 
Officer Jensen of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force also arrived at this 
time and questioned defendant again following a second administration and waiver of 
Miranda rights (R. 103:46,91-94). When Officer Jensen asked defendant if he ever 
shared his marijuana with his friends, defendant responded, "basically,... I mean if 
that's what you're getting at, I mean I don't know" (R. 103:99-100). Defendant admitted 
that he had sold marijuana "a long time ago," but also claimed that marijuana in his trailer 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965). 
3Deputy Barnett's interview of defendant in the trailer was audio video recorded 
and was played for the trial court during the bench trial (R. 103:42-45). The video has 
not been included in the record on appeal; however, the State's Objection to the motion to 
suppress indicates that during the interview defendant told Deputy Barnett, among other 
things, that the marijuana belonged to him, and that his friends and coworkers "abuse his 
stash" (R. 69). 
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was ujust my stash" (R. 103:101). Defendant claimed that he stored the marijuana in 
different quantities "as he comes and goes" (R. 103:103, 108-09). 
Based on defendant's statements to Deputy Barnett and Officer Jensen, as well as 
additional information that defendant had a history of drug crimes, Agent Burnett, also 
with the strike force, obtained a search warrant for the safe (R. 103:115-116) (a copy of 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant has not been included in the record on 
appeal). Two baggies containing approximately 85.8 grams of marijuana were seized (R. 
103:116, 119). In Agent Burnett's experience this amount was "too large" for merely 
personal use (R. 103:123-24). Indeed, "an ounce is probably the average amount... This 
is four or five times that amount" (id.). Additionally, defendant's manner of storing the 
marijuana in separate baggies and locations was also inconsistent with his claim of 
personal use (R. 103:124-125). Finally, a recreational user typically uses marijuana only 
one to three times per week, and the average pipe bowl only holds approximately one 
gram of marijuana, while a rolled joint holds "a little less depending on how big they 
want to roll it" (R. 103:126). Thus, defendant's approximate 129 grams of marijuana 
could be made into at least as many joints (R. 103:126-127,148). It would take the 
average marijuana user a little less than two years to consume this amount (R. 103:127). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed the marijuana and 
related paraphernalia seized pursuant to a third-party consent search of his trailer, and to a 
warrant-supported search of a safe located inside the trailer. However, defendant has not 
included a transcript of the preliminary hearing, the suppression hearing, or the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant in the appellate record. The trial court did not rule on the 
motion to suppress until after the bench trial in this matter, but relied upon evidence 
adduced at the preliminary and suppression hearings, as well as the search warrant 
affidavit in denying the motion to suppress. As a result, this Court is not in a position to 
review the trial court's ruling. The Court should therefore presume the correctness of the 
proceedings below. 
As for defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he 
intended to distribute the 129 grams of marijuana seized, he has not marshaled the 
evidence and demonstrated that even viewed in the light most favorable to the bench 
verdict, the evidence is inadequate. His claim should be rejected on this ground alone. 
Finally, this Court cannot review defendant's claim that the district court erred in 
allowing the State to refile the instant charges and in scheduling a preliminary hearing 
because the claim is not grounded in the record on appeal. Indeed, the record on appeal is 
effectively silent regarding the factual predicate of defendant's claim, i.e., that any prior 
dismissal and/or refiling of the instant charge occurred, let alone the reasons for the prior 
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dismissal. As with the first issue, it is the defendant's burden to support his allegation of 
error with an adequate record. Because this Court will not consider evidence which is not 
part of the record, the proceedings below are presumed correct, and defendant's claim of 
error should be rejected. In any event, any error in allowing the State to refile the instant 
charges was harmless because defendant was subsequently convicted beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ADMITTING EVIDENCE IS 
PRESUMED CORRECT BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
INCLUDED THE PRELIMINARY OR SUPPRESSION HEARING 
TRANSCRIPTS, OR THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE 
SEARCH WARRANT IN THE APPELLATE RECORD 
In Points I-III of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling admitting 
marijuana seized pursuant to third-party consent search of his trailer, and a warranted-
supported search of a safe located inside the trailer. Aplt Br. at 8-15. Specifically, 
defendant claims that police unreasonably believed that his girlfriend, who greeted 
Deputy Barnett in her pajamas that morning, had authority to consent to the search. Aplt. 
Br. at 8-13. He also claims that because the affidavit in support of the search warrant for 
a safe located inside the trailer contained information uncovered during the prior 
warrantless search, the affidavit was legally insufficient. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. 
However, defendant failed to include in the record on appeal the transcripts of the 
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preliminary hearing held on 21 May 1999 (R. 23), the suppression hearing held on 15 
June 1999 (R. 35-37), and the affidavit in support of the search warrant, all of which the 
trial court purportedly relied upon in ruling on the motion to suppress.4 See Aplt. Br. at 5. 
Therefore, this Court is foreclosed from reviewing the trial court's ruling denying the 
motion to suppress. See State v. Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) ("When a defendant predicates error to this Court, he has 
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent 
that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the 
review court has no power to determine."). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the following 
requirement for appellants: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct the appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 11(e)(2). Defendant failed to meet this requirement by failing to include 
4Defendant has attached a copy of the search warrant affidavit to his brief. See 
Aplt. Br. at addendum. However, a party is not free merely to addend documentary 
evidence to its brief. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l 1)(C) (addendum may contain "parts of 
the record on appeal"); UTAH R. APP. P. 11(e)(2) (appellant's burden to make sure record 
on appeal includes all relevant evidence). See also State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f 6-7,974 
P.2d 279 (declining to consider documents attached to Pliego's brief, but which were not 
made part of the record on appeal on ground that the record may not be supplemented by 
simply including omitted material in the party's addendum). 
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in the record the pertinent transcripts and the affidavit in support of the search warrant. In 
the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only "presume the correctness 
of the proceedings below." State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 131 (Utah App. 1997). See 
also State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033,110 S.Ct. 751 (1990). 
Because defendant has not included in the appellate record the pertinent transcripts 
or the search warrant affidavit, this Court "will presume that the trial court made the 
appropriate findings on the record" to supports its ruling denying the motion to suppress. 
Snyderf 932 P.2d at 131. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE BECAUSE HE FAILS TO MARSHAL 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
HE INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE THE 129 GRAMS OF SEIZED 
MARIJUANA 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
show that he intended to distribute approximately 129 grams of marijuana seized from 
inside his trailer (R. 103:148). Aplt. Br. at 13-15. However, in making his argument that 
the evidence presented at the bench trial was insufficient to convict, defendant fails to 
meet his burden to marshal the evidence. 
"When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal, the appellant 
must show that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous. In order to show clear error, 
12 
the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of 
fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 
19A P.2d 475 (Utah 1990). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). If 
the appellant makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling 
and to demonstrate its insufficiency, the appellate court "accepts the trial court's findings 
as stated in its ruling." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, at % 13, 983 P.2d 556. See also 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991 (failure to marshal 
evidence). 
Here, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to 
distribute the seized marijuana (R. 104:5-6), add. A. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
2(l)(n) (1998) ("'Distribute' means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a 
controlled substance or a listed chemical"). Specifically, the trial court emphasized (a) 
the combined total of marijuana seized from defendant's trailer, approximately 129 
grams; (b) the officers' expert testimony that this amount is "more substantial than one 
would normally have for their individual use"; (c) defendant's manner of storing the 
marijuana in separate baggies and locations; and in particular (d) defendant's own 
statements "that he had people over at times that were - - could be using his stash" {id). 
The trial court's findings are supported in the record. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
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In challenging these findings, defendant has wholly failed to marshal the evidence. 
Instead of listing, "in comprehensive and fastidious order," the evidence presented by the 
State in support of his conviction, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991), defendant recites only his version of selected evidence that 
favors his claim that all 129 grams of the seized marijuana was for his personal use. Aplt. 
Br. at 15-16. Defendant's failure to marshal is alone grounds to reject his claim. State v. 
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
Additionally, defendant fails to provide an adequate record upon which to review 
the trial court's findings in regard to his sufficiency challenge. Specifically, defendant 
has not included in the record on appeal the videotape of Deputy Barnett's interview with 
defendant which was played at the bench trial (see R. 103:43-45). See Wulfenstein, 657 
P.2d at 293; Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (appellant's duty to provide adequate record for 
appeal). In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only "presume 
the correctness of the proceedings below." Snyder, 932 P.2d at 131; Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 
67; Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d at 1150. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO GROUND HIS CLAIM OF ERROR 
REGARDING THE REFILING OF CHARGES AND SCHEDULING 
OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING IN THE RECORD 
In Point V of his brief, defendant complains that the trial court dismissed this case 
after the State's witness's allegedly failed to appear for a scheduled preliminary hearing, 
14 
but allowed the State to refile without demonstrating the existence of any new evidence 
understate v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Aplt. Br. at 16-17. However, because 
the charges were not dismissed on grounds of insufficient evidence, defendant also 
correctly concedes that "[tjhis is not truly a Brickey case[.]" Aplt. Br. at 16.5 
Notwithstanding defendant's concession, his claim fails because it is not grounded 
in the record on appeal. Indeed, the record on appeal is effectively silent regarding the 
factual predicate of defendant's claim, i.e., that any dismissal and/or refiling of the instant 
charge occurred. As set out in Points I and II of this brief, it is the defendant's burden to 
support his allegation of error with an adequate record. Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d at 293. 
Because this Court will not consider evidence which is not part of the record, the 
proceedings below are presumed correct, and defendant's claim of error should be 
rejected. 
In any event, any error in allowing the State to refile the instant charges for 
5Brickey was charged with forcible sexual assault. Id. at 645. At the close of the 
preliminary hearing, Brickey moved to dismiss on the ground the State failed to establish 
that he had acted without the victim's consent. Id. The circuit court agreed and 
dismissed the charges. Id. Thereafter, the State refiled the charge in another court and a 
second preliminary hearing was held before a different judge. Id. The second court 
denied Brickey's motion to dismiss and bound him over for trial. The district court 
subsequently refused to quash the bindover order. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court noted that Brickey raised an issue of first 
impression in Utah: "[W]hat are the limits on the State's ability to refile criminal charges 
when those charges have been previously dismissed for insufficient evidence?" Id. at 
646. The supreme court resolved the issue limiting the State's right to refile charges 
previously dismissed for insufficient evidence. Id. at 647. 
15 
purposes of rescheduling the preliminary hearing here was harmless because defendant 
was subsequently convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 
566 (Utah App.) (recognizing that "an error at the preliminary hearing stage is cured if the 
defendant is later convicted beyond a reasonable doubt"), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1992); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n.6 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that 
"any challenge to the bindover order would be mooted by the trial verdict"). See also 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 113-15, 989 P.2d 52 (holding that a jury verdict moots a 
challenge to a grand jury indictment). While there are exceptions to this well established 
rule, defendant's allegations do not rise such here. See Whittle, 1999 UT at f 13 n.l 
(providing examples of appropriate cases for post-conviction dismissal of an indictment 
including racial discrimination in selection of the grand jurors, and exclusion of women 
from the grand jury). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's felony drug conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on // September 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
^ ^ I A N DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER., COUNTY 
- -4 
STATE OF UTAH 
***** MAR 2 - c . J . 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
) VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
VS. ) 
) CASE NO. 9 9 1 9 0 0 4 8 0 
TROY REES, ) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
***** 
COURT'S RULING 
OCTOBER 2 1 , 1999 
HONORABLE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: MS. CAMILLE L. NEIDER 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. H. DON SHARP 
FILED 
APR 1 3 2GG0 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ORIGINAL WIOTVA 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 1Q4 
THE CLERK: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS TROY REES, 
991900480. 
THE COURT: THIS IS THE -- THIS IS THE TIME SET IN 
THIS CASE. THIS IS A CASE WHERE A TRIAL WAS HELD. 
PRELIMINARILY TO THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THAT HAD BEEN FILED. THE COURT AGREED THAT IT WOULD TAKE 
TESTIMONY IN THE TRIAL AND RESERVE RULING ON THE -- THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. SO THE COURT INTENDS, FIRST OF ALL, TO 
RULE ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'LL DO 
FIRST. 
I HAVE RECEIVED FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE CASE WELL 
WRITTEN BRIEFS. SUBSTANTIAL CASES HAVE BEEN CITED. I HAVE 
HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW MANY OF THOSE CASES THAT HAVE BEEN 
SUBMITTED TO ME. 
THE DEFENSE CLAIMS THAT IN -- IN POINT ONE OF ITS BRIEF 
THAT AN OVERNIGHT GUEST DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO WAIVE 
THE OWNER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
REASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE RODRIGUEZ CASE FILED BY 
THE -- A CASE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ALSO A --
A-UTAH CASE. IN THE ARGUMENT WELL PRESENTED BY MR. SHARP, 
THE COURT FINDS THAT -- THAT IN MOST OF THOSE CASES THE --
THE CITES ARE RELATING TO JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN THE STATE 
OF UTAH WHERE OTHER STATES HAVE INTERPRETED THEIR 
CONSTITUTION AS REQUIRING DIFFERENT TYPES OF AUTHORITY IN 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
1 ORDER TO WAIVE THEIR FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
2 IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THERE WAS A 
3 CONSENT. THAT -- THAT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT. THE 
4 CONSENT WAS, IN FACT, GIVEN. THE QUESTION WAS -- IS WHETHER 
5 OR NOT THE YOUNG LADY THAT WAS THERE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO 
6 GIVE THAT CONSENT. 
7 IN REVIEWING IT, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE RODRIGUEZ AND 
8 THE DAVIS CASES ARE BINDING TO THIS COURT AND FINDS THAT --
9 THE QUESTION WAS --IS WHAT -- WHAT A REASONABLE PERSON 
10 WOULD THINK WHEN A -- UNDER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
11 CASE, WHAT A REASONABLE PERSON, REASONABLE POLICE OFFICER 
12 WOULD THINK, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD A REASONABLE CONSENT 
13 GIVEN TO THEM TO SEARCH THIS FIFTH WHEEL TRAILER. 
14 ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO CASES THAT DRAW THE DISTINCTION 
15 OF THAT, THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS THAT -- THAT LEAD ME TO 
16 CONCLUDE THAT THE CONSENT WAS PROPER. THOSE ARE AS 
17 FOLLOWS -- AND NOT IN DETAIL: BUT THAT THE YOUNG LADY WAS 
18 THERE. SHE HAD SPENT THE NIGHT THERE. SHE WAS FAMILIAR 
19 WITH THE --MR. HUNT, WHO THE OFFICER WAS THERE TO SEEK. 
20 THAT -- THAT SHE HAD STAYED THERE ON OTHER OCCASIONS. SHE 
21 WAS --FAMILIAR WITH THE SURROUNDING WITH THE SMALL AREA OF 
22 THIS FIFTH WHEEL TRAILER. SHE HAD SOME BELONGINGS THERE. 
23 THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS --IT WAS REASONABLE TO 
24 THE OFFICER THAT WAS THERE IN THAT BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME, IT 
25 WAS REASONABLE THAT -- THAT THE CONSENT OF -- I FORGET HER 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
NAME --MS. ATKINS, WAS THAT --
MS. NEIDER: ATKINS. 
THE COURT: ATKINS CONSENT WAS REASONABLE AND THAT 
THAT CONSENT THERE PASSES OVER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. I FIND THAT -- THAT, THEREFORE, THE 
MOTION IN THAT ISSUE TO SUPPRESS IS DENIED. 
THE QUESTION THEN COMES -- THERE IS A -- THE ISSUE OF 
THE --OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. AGAIN, THE COURT HAS REVIEWED 
SOME PRIOR NOTES AND PRIOR EDUCATION THAT -- THAT WE HAVE 
RECEIVED ON THAT ISSUE, AS WELL AS SOME -- THE COURT'S 
TREATMENT. AND THE COURT FINDS THAT -- THAT -- THAT THIS --
THAT THIS COURT HAS SOME LIMITED ABILITY IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER THE ISSUING MAGISTRATE --IN THIS CASE WAS ANOTHER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE -- LACKED THE BASIS FOR ISSUING THAT 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
I HAVE BEEN THROUGH THAT. MR. SHARP RIGHTLY RAISES THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE -- THERE WAS A STATEMENT IN 
THE --IN THE SEARCH WARRANT THAT SAYS SOMETHING TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THERE WAS A LARGE QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA INSIDE 
THE PREMISES. THOUGH I THINK THAT -- I DON'T KNOW THAT I 
WOULD QUALIFY OR QUANTIFY THAT AS A LARGE AMOUNT OF 
MARIJUANA, AGAIN, THE CASE LAW TELLS US THAT THERE'S ONLY A 
PROBABILITY, NOT A PRIMA FACIA SHOWING OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
IN ORDER FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO ISSUE THAT -- THAT SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
THE --MR. SHARP HAS AGAIN RAISED THAT SOME OF THE 
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THAT WARRANT WAS VERY OLD 
INFORMATION DATING BACK TO THE YEARS 1990 AND 1991; HOWEVER, 
THAT INFORMATION WAS SET FORTH IN THE SEARCH WARRANT, AND 
JUDGE TAYLOR, ACTING AS THE MAGISTRATE IN THAT CASE, HAD 
THAT INFORMATION. IT WAS NOT -- APPEARS TO ME -- ANYTHING 
THAT WAS INACCURATE OR -- IN THAT WARRANT, WITH THE 
EXCEPTION OF THE -- THE QUALIFICATION OF WHETHER OR NOT THAT 
AMOUNT THAT WAS TAKEN FROM THE TIN QUALIFIED AS A LARGE 
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA. 
BUT UNDER THE CASE LAW THAT I HAVE AGAIN REVIEWED, IT 
MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THAT'S NOT THIS COURT'S DECISION. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT MAKES NO RULING ON THAT AND WILL NOT 
SUPPRESS THE SEARCH OF THE SAFE THAT WAS INSIDE. 
WITH THAT THEN COMES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT 
THIS DEFENDANT SHOULD BE -- BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY THAT 
THE COURT HEARD, THAT THIS DEFENDANT SHOULD BE FOUND GUILTY 
OF THE CHARGE OR FOUND NOT GUILTY OF THE DISTRIBUTION CASE, 
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. AS I --
MR. SHARPS NO, IT'S A THIRD. 
MS. NBIDER: IT'S A THIRD, JUDGE. 
THB COURT: THIRD DEGREE, YEAH, I'M SORRY. THIRD 
DEGREE POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE BECAUSE IT WAS MARIJUANA. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT -- WHY DON'T YOU BRING MR. REES UP 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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HERE, MR. SHARP. THE COURT FINDS THAT BASED UPON THE 
TESTIMONY AND THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT, 
THE FOLLOWING: FIRST OF ALL, THAT WITH THE -- THE 
COMBINATION OF THE --OF THE MARIJUANA FOUND IN THE SAFE AND 
THE -- WITH THAT FOUND IN THE TIN, THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT 
THAT IS -- AND THE TESTIMONY -- FINDS FROM THE TESTIMONY 
THAT THAT AMOUNT IS MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN ONE WOULD NORMALLY 
HAVE FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL USE. 
MR. SHARP RAISES AGAIN, IN THE BRIEF, THE QUESTION --
THE ISSUE OF THERE WERE NO SCALES, SOME OF THOSE OTHER 
THINGS THAT ARE NORMALLY INVOLVED IN THE -- IN A 
DISTRIBUTION CASE. THERE WAS SOME BAGGIES THAT WERE THERE, 
SOME DIVISION FOUND -- DIVISION OF THE MARIJUANA. PLUS, 
WHEN THOSE ARE COMBINED, IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT. 
ALSO, STATEMENTS GIVEN TO THE -- FROM --TO THE 
OFFICERS BY THE DEFENDANT THAT HE HAD PEOPLE OVER AT TIMES 
THAT WERE -- COULD BE USING HIS STASH. THAT, IN ITSELF, IS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT FINDS THE DEFENDANT --
MR. REES, I FIND YOU GUILTY OF THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
REFER THIS MATTER TO THE ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
DEPARTMENT FOR PURPOSES OF GETTING A PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
DOING SO I WANT TO -- MR. SHARP, I DO APPRECIATE THE 
SUBSTANTIAL RESEARCH THAT WAS DONE IN THIS --IN THIS CASE. 
AND, ALSO, TO YOU, MS. NEIDER. THESE ARE BRIEFS THAT I WILL 
RETAIN, AS WELL AS THE CASES THAT I HAVE PULLED AS A RESULT 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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OF THESE. I 
I THINK 
WAS GIVEN BY 
PROVIDED. I 
THINK IT WAS WELL DONE. 
EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE CASE, MR. REES, 
MR. SHARP IN THE SUBSTANTIAL CASES THAT WERE 
JUST THINK THAT MOST OF THOSE WERE DIFFERENT 
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE FOUND -- HELD DIFFERENTLY BASED UPON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 
HASN'T HELD. 
THOSE STATES, WHICH THE STATE OF UTAH 
LET'S GET A DATE FOR SENTENCING. 
PROBATION: 
THE COURT: 
GOOD FOR YOU? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. SHARP? 
MR. 
THE 
WE SHOULDN'T 
MR. 
THE 
SHARP: 
COURT: 
SHARP: 
COURT: 
SHARP: 
COURT: 
DECEMBER 2ND? 
DECEMBER 2ND? MR. SHARP, IS THAT DATE 
IT'S MY BIRTHDAY. 
WHAT BETTER DAY THAN ON YOUR BIRTHDAY? 
HUH? 
WHAT BETTER DAY THAN ON YOUR BIRTHDAY, 
LET'S DO IT THEN. I MAY WORK. 
I GUESS IT WOULDN'T BE A CELEBRATION SO 
HAVE CAKE. 
SHARP: 
COURT: 
FOR SENTENCING AT 9 
IF YOU'LL PICK 
HERE OVER TO THE --
(WHEREUPON, AT 
NO. 
WE'LL SEE YOU BACK HERE AT THAT TIME 
O'CLOCK. 
UP A SLIP, MR. REES, AND TAKE IT FROM 
THIS TIME PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDE.) 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, LAURIE SHINGLE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
SEVEN PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE 
RECORD OF THE VIDEO-TAPED PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY 
KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH, THIS THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH, 
2000. 
LAURIE SHINGLE, 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
